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JUSTICE WHITE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
PHILIP J. WEISER*

The art of judging remains a subject of heated debate
among constitutional scholars. In his paper, Professor Bill
Nelson presents a powerful case that Justice White offers an
ideal type for the constitutional judge. As countries around the
world are increasingly adopting constitutional courts similar to
the Supreme Court established in the U.S. Constitution,1 the
scholarly enterprise of explaining the value of judicial review
and the role of the constitutional judge has taken on added importance. To add to Professor Nelson's praise for Justice
White, I will explain how Justice White's approach to judging
reflects an important sensitivity to judicial strategy.
It is a special pleasure for me to have the opportunity to
evaluate Justice White's legacy at this Rothgerber Conference.
For those of us privileged to know Byron White, there can be
little question that he never forgot where he came from. In this
respect, this conference also reflects a quality that I respect
deeply about Justice White-unlike some judges, the idea of being celebrated and canonized by an academic conference would
make him very uncomfortable. From his early days as a football star, Justice White viewed the concept of celebrity with
healthy suspicion2 and, later as a Supreme Court Justice, he
viewed academic criticism or notoriety with an ironic detachment at best and a caustic distaste at worst.
Even after his remarkably long tenure, Justice White
never viewed his service on the Supreme Court as a central
part of his identify and never viewed himself as carrying out a

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. Thanks to David
Ebel, Bob Nagel, Josie Sandler, and Heidi Wald for helpful comments and encouragement. It was my great pleasure to serve as a law clerk for Justice White after
his retirement, during the October 1995 Term, when I also served as a law clerk
to Justice Ginsburg.
1. See Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism,38 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 473, 474 (2003) ("Over the last half-century, judicial review has
gone from rare to almost universal in democratic regimes around the world.").
2. This point is detailed in Dennis Hutchinson's well drawn portrait of Justice White. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER
WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 39-42 (1998).
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jurisprudential mission to remake the law in any particular
form. Rather, as Professor Nelson relates, Justice White
viewed his service on the Supreme Court as merely a "job," and
as Justice White himself explained at his confirmation hearing,
he believed that the essence of the job was to "decide cases."3
At his core, Justice White remained a citizen of the West, a
friend of scores of Coloradans, and a devoted fan of CU football.4 This is not to suggest that White did not take his work
seriously; to the contrary, Justice White remained an avid
reader of the law reviews and continued to keep up with cutting edge scholarship even after he retired from the Court.
Nonetheless, I agree with Professor Nelson that he certainly
would have wondered whether participating in an academic
conference was the best use of one's time.5 Indeed, while he
appreciated the importance of teaching and scholarship, he often remarked that he wished that more of his law clerks would
pursue work in politics and public service than as law professors.
In reflecting on Justice White's judicial legacy, it is notable
how law professors routinely overlook his contributions to the
Court and his very admirable approach to judging. This phenomenon probably reflects Justice White's discomfort with attracting attention, the liberal academic criticism with his
stance in Roe v. Wade6 and Bowers v. Hardwick,7 and his reluctance to engage in anything approaching grand, self-conscious
theorizing. This last point is reflected most clearly in his understandably criticized concurrence in the Union Gas case,
where he explained his vote deciding an important Eleventh
Amendment issue by curiously stating only "I agree with the
conclusion reached by Justice Brennan... although I do not

3. See William E. Nelson, JusticeByron R. White: His Legacy for the TwentyFirst Century, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (2003); Louis F. Orberdorfer, In
Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116 HARV. L. REV. 3, 4 (2002).

4. For this reason, Justice White's receipt of the Citizen of the West award is
a far more fitting honor than anything that a legal academic conference can convey. Judge David Ebel captured this aspect of Justice White in a tribute to him
delivered as part of the Citizen of the West ceremony. See David M. Ebel, Byron
R. White-A Justice Shaped By The West, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1421 (2000) [hereinafter Ebel, Shaped By The West]
5.

See Nelson, supra note 3, at 1297 (noting oddity of trying to discern a ju-

dicial legacy that, due to his humility, Justice White worked so assiduously to
"leave us little in the way of a distinctive [articulated] legal philosophy").
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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agree with much of his reasoning."' Whatever the reason(s), it
is most unfortunate that the legal academy has not generally
appreciated Justice White's model of judging, particularly
when it celebrates theories of judicial review long after Justice
White put them into practice. 9
In recent times, as appeals courts judges and academicminded individuals have predominated among those elevated
to the Supreme Court, there is often a stark contrast between
how Supreme Court Justices view the political process and how
it actually works. Justice White's training for the Court, like a
number of his contemporaries in the middle part of the twentieth century, stemmed from his work in practice and government. As such, he brought three important qualities to judging
that are essential to an effective judicial strategy and not always in great supply at the Supreme Court: a humility that
appreciates the limits of courts as instruments for social
change; a deep-seated pragmatism that shaped his thinking
about how judges should decide cases; and, finally, an acute
recognition that legal doctrine shapes a system that must be
implemented by practicing lawyers and judges.
As Justice White was a man of action first and foremost, I
do not claim that his appreciation for judicial strategy reflected
a self-conscious and preconceived judicial philosophy. Rather, I
believe that Justice White's intuitive and learned appreciation
for the nature of law and politics shaped how he did his job.
Unfortunately, legal academics and even journalists-who tend
to value self-conscious theorizing-have underappreciated Justice White's model ofjudicial strategy.1"
Justice White's judicial humility captures both his personal temperament and his view of the judiciary in relation to
the other branches of government.1 ' Some critics of Justice

8.

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 57 (1989) (White, J., concur-

ring in the judgment).
9. In particular, I have in mind the theories "democratic experimentalism"
and "judicial minimalism." See infra notes 10, 45.

10. Justice White, for example, would appear to be an exemplary model and
a precursor for Cass Sunstein's ideal approach of taking "one case at a time." See
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 4 (1999) ("[M]inimalist rulings increase the

space for further reflection and debate at the local, state, and national levels, simply because they do not foreclose subsequent decisions."). With only a few exceptions, however, Sunstein's account of judicial minimalism does not recognize Justice White's sensitivity on this score. See id. at 33 (discussing Justice White's
position in Griswold).

11.

For a poignant description of Justice White's character and humility, see
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White focus on his opinions in Roe and Bowers and suggest
that Justice Blackmun, for example, better typifies an ideal
judge for "taking the right position" in both cases. But focusing
on Justice Blackmun's conclusions in those two cases (and the
"heroism" associated with the causes he championed) overlooks
the point that Justice White's understanding of the judiciary
provides a better model for judging in that he recognized the
institutional limitations of the judiciary.1 2 Thus, regardless of
the lessons one draws with regard to the institutional limits of
the judiciary and their application to the Roe and Bowers cases,
one must appreciate that brushing aside those limits, as Justice Blackmun's perspective on judging often led him to do,13
threatens to mire the judiciary in matters for which it is illsuited. Notably, Justice White regularly called the Court's attention to comparative expertise issues-such as in dissenting
from its oversight of the campaign finance laws under Buckley
v. Valeo 1 4 -even though such concerns were brushed aside not
only by Justice Blackmun, but by most of his colleagues on the
Court.
Justice White and Justice Blackmun (or Justice Brennan,
on Professor Nelson's account) offer polar opposite examples
about how courts should act in relation to other branches of
government. On my account, Justice White's views in Roe,
Bowers, and Buckley do not necessarily reflect a moral insensitivity, but rather reflect a very cautious sensibility about how

David M. Ebel, Justice Bryon R. White: The Legend and The Man, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (2002).
12. Professor Ronald Dworkin offers a similar explanation for how the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment can be understood to hold a robust concept of
equality, even if they misapplied that concept by also holding a conception of
equality that allowed for segregated schools. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 70-72, 362-63 (1986).
13. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling for judicial oversight of child
welfare authorities and requirement of affirmative assistance to protect children
from parents). For an effective critique of DeShaney and how the judicial recognition of rights of actions in areas not well understood by courts can lead to unfortunate unintended consequences, see RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 208211 (1995).
14. 424 U.S. 1, 257 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Echoing Justice White's approach taken over twenty five years earlier, Justice Breyer recently endorsed judicial humility for such questions as campaign finance laws, where "answers [to those questions] reflect empirical matters about
which the legislature is comparatively expert." See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution,77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 254 (2002).
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the Court should act strategically vis-A-vis other branches of
government. 1" Regardless of whether one thinks Justice White
applied this strategic sensibility with an overabundance of caution-and it is important to remember that he sided with the
Warren Court majority in Griswold v. Connecticut,6 a number
of important civil rights cases, 7 and the gender discrimination
cases1--it is important to realize that the Supreme Court must

be pragmatic about when it is institutionally well suited to effectuate constitutional principles. 9 In Griswold, for example,
it bears notice that, unlike Roe, the Court's decision only affected the two states that had refused to repeal laws limiting
access to contraception for married couples.2" Significantly,
Justice White did not reject the premise that the Due Process
Clause could give rise to substantive rights, but he did believe
that the Court needed to be very careful in defining the liberty
interest protected by it.2 '
The current member of the Court whose views are closest
to Justice White's on the role that courts should play in a constitutional democracy may well be Justice Ginsburg, who took

15. Where Justice White deserves criticism is for the detached and unsympathetic tone he took towards the nature of the claim advanced by the plaintiff in
Bowers. See Ebel, Shaped By The West, supra note 4, at 1423 (noting that Justice
White's opinions were "often criticized as much for their tone as for the result"
and explaining that "for better or worse, style and tone never were matters of very
high priority with Justice White."). For a powerful argument that constitutional
courts should respect the moral claims of those before them, even when rejecting
their arguments, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-68 (1983).
16. 381 U.S. 479, 503 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
17. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 762 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing for a more robust form of judicial relief to address segregated
schools).
18. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
19. As Chris Eisgruber put it, where "strategic issues dominate moral
ones ... the case for judicial deference to legislatures is strong." Christopher L.
Eisgruber, ConstitutionalSelf-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply To Five
Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 115, 182 (2002). In a related conception of this issue,
Lawrence Sager suggests that courts can withhold relief-and defer to other bodies-in cases where their ability to implement constitutional principles are suspect. See Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
20. See Posner, supra note 13, at 226.
21. See John Paul Stevens, A Tribute To Justice White, 112 YALE L.J. 969,
971 (2003) (discussing Justice White's belief in, but tempered interpretation of
substantive due process rights); Michael Herz, To Legitimacy: Justice White and
Strict Rational Basis Scrutiny, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1346--1349 (2003) (discussing
Justice White's approach in Griswold).
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Justice White's seat on the Court. Given her important role in
litigating on behalf of gender equality, commentators are often
quick to link her to Justice Blackmun rather than Justice
White. But a more careful examination of her judicial philosophy underscores the connections between her thinking and
Justice White's-even if they view Roe and Bowers differently.
Most notably, Justice Ginsburg has offered her own criticism of
Roe on grounds related to Justice White's criticism of that decision; in particular, she explained that Roe suffered from judicial hubris in that it created its own legal regime that displaced
almost every state law in force.22 Using a more effective judicial strategy, Justice Ginsburg argued, the Court might have
chosen a more modest role for itself, complementing, rather
23
than displacing, the political reform debates then underway.
This sensitivity, reflected both in Justice White and Ginsburg's
thinking, not only provides important lessons for the scope of
judicial doctrine, but also provides important lessons for the
development and implementation of judicially devised remedies.2 4 Justice Ginsburg continues Justice White's legacy of being very sensitive to the institutional competence limitations of
federal courts. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's description of Justice White as "constantly remind[ing] the Court to consider the
consequences and common sense of the legal rules it announ [ces]" 25 could easily describe her approach to judging.2 6

22. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking In A Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165, 1199 (1992).
23. Id.
24. For an application of how this lesson translates to constitutional law, see
Phil Weiser, What's Quality Got To Do With It: ConstitutionalTheory, Politicsand
Education Reform, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 745 (1995); see also Jonathan R. Werner, No Knight In Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent Public
Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform In West
Virginia, 35 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 61 (2002) (explaining why judicial remediation without public support or legislative involvement is a failing strategy for
social change). For an application of this lesson to antitrust law, see Philip J.
Weiser, Goldwasser, The Enforcement of the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
25. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1283, 1285 (2003).

26. At her confirmation hearing, Justice Ginsburg described her judicial philosophy as "rooted in the place of the judiciary-of judges-in our democratic society."
18 HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS

OF

SUPREME

COURT

JUSTICES

BY

THE

SENATE

JUDICIARY

COMMITTEE 1916-1993: RUTH BADER GINSBURG 260 (Roy M. Mersky et al eds.,
1995). For a recent example of Justice Ginsburg's sensitivity to democracy and
the practical effect of the Court's decisions, see State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins.
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The second salutary aspect of Justice White's judicial philosophy was his refreshing pragmatism. Unlike other judges,
who often suggest that they are not exercising discretion even
when engaged in interstitial law making, Justice White did not
shy from the fact that the judiciary plays an essential lawmaking role. In interpreting the Constitution, he generally
avoided relying on history, original intent, or the manipulation
of past doctrine, instead focusing on the context and consequences of the decision at hand. For this reason, Judge Louis
Oberdorfer termed Justice White a "realistic, common law constitutionalist" who eschewed a hyper-technical approach to legal doctrine in general and constitutional law in particular.2 8
For an example of Justice White's pragmatic approach,
consider New York v. United States,29 in which Justice
O'Connor authored a majority opinion that justified its results,
at least in part, by pointing to a historical record that provided
ambiguous support for the Court's ultimate judgment." In so
doing, Justice O'Connor ignored, as Justice White pointed out
in dissent, that the claimed "coercion" to which the states objected involved legislation for which the states had lobbied."
Justice White, in both federalism cases and separation of powers ones, argued very forcefully and effectively for a functionalist perspective on how the judiciary could aid the political process as opposed to a formalistic perspective that all too often
denied reality. 2 The Supreme Court did not follow his lead in

Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1531 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (calling

judicially crafted regime imposed on states to restrict punitive damage awards as
"boldly out of order").
27. I recognize the debates around the use of the term "pragmatism" and
like Professor Grey find it sufficient for my purposes to define it as "antiformal-

ism." See Grey, supra note 1, at 478.
28. See Louis F. Oberdorfer, Justice White and The Yale Legal Realists, 103
YALE L.J. 5, 16 (1993).
29. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
30. See Martin S. Flaherty, Byron White, Federalism, and The "Greatest
Generation(s)," 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1573, 1605-06 (2003); see also New York, 505

U.S. at 207 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's "many invocations
of history" constituted nothing "other than elaborate window dressing").
31. Compare 505 U.S. at 166 (invoking history and precedent) with 505 U.S.
at 189-90 (White, J., dissenting) (recounting origin of legislation as ratification of
regime developed by states and urged upon Congress by them).
32. See Flaherty, supra note 30, at 1576. Two defenses of a formalist approach bear notice. First, as Larry Lessig has argued, it is possible that one
might invoke formal reasons for an approach as a justification, even while supporting that approach on functional grounds. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating
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many of those cases, but Justice White's conception of the role
of judges continues to be very influential and important. In
particular, as Justice Stevens acknowledged in a recent tribute,
Justice White-not surprisingly given his sensitivity to institutional competence-played a crucial role in moving the Supreme Court towards the deferential stance taken towards administrative agencies in the Chevron doctrine.3 3
Finally, let me salute Justice White's appreciation for the
fact that Supreme Court decisions provide rules to be implemented by lower courts and practicing attorneys.34 More so
than any of his contemporaries, Justice White remained
acutely conscious of instances where the Supreme Court
needed to step in to resolve circuit conflicts or clear up areas of
legal doctrine that confused lower courts and practicing attorneys. 35 In a similar vein, Justice White's focus on the importance of developing sound and workable rules also led him to be
a leader in the Court's antirust revolution, which rejected the
broad use of formal, categorical rules in favor of a more factsensitive inquiry.3 6 In short, Justice White championed the
importance of clearly resolving the issues addressed by the
Court, expressing his hope upon leaving the Court that its
"'mandates will be clear [and] crisp, . .. leav[ing] as little room
as possible for disagreement about their meaning."'37

Federalism, 66 GEO. L. REV. 1218, 1234 (1998). Second, as Allison Eid has explained, it is conceivable that formal and categorical rules-as opposed to more
flexible and functional ones-are necessary to implement any judicially enforced
commitments to federalism on the ground that federal judges will be all too willing to compromise state interests in favor of federal ones to which they are more
obedient. See Allison Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. (forthcoming 2003).
33. See John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (2002). For an explanation of the significance of this approach, and its
contribution towards a more effective lawmaking system, see Philip J. Weiser,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001).
34. Professor Fallon elaborates on this critical role of the Supreme Court in
a recent book. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION
(2001).
35. John Paul Stevens, "Cheers!"A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 1994
B.Y.U. L. REV. 209, 216-17.
36. Most notably, Justice White's opinion in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc., which famously explained that "easy labels do not
always supply ready answers," instructed courts to be very careful before condemning unexamined conduct as per se illegal. 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979).
37. Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 1289 (quoting Justice White's letter upon
announcing his retirement).
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His sensitivity to the role of the Supreme Court in superintending a legal system reflects Justice White's functionalist
orientation. In particular, Justice White appreciated that formalism, where divorced from reality, threatened to create considerable instability by providing unworkable legal regimes.
Returning to the examples of federalism and the political process, this concern proved prescient both in National League of
Cities v. Usery3 s and in Shaw v. Reno.39 As for the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence in New York and its progeny, I
believe that there is a useful (albeit limited) role for an anticommandeering principle, but I acknowledge that there are legitimate concerns that the Court will go far beyond such a role
in the current federalism revival.4 ° Moreover, I most certainly
agree with Justice White's sentiment that the justification for
any judicially enforced anti-commandeering principle should be
whether it facilitates an effective regime of cooperative federalism and not whether it follows from a formalistic understanding of federal-state relations. 4 '
All three elements of Justice White's appreciation for judicial strategy reflect an approach to constitutionalism as a
means for practical governance. As Justice Jackson explained
in his concurrence in the Steel Seizure cases, interpreting the
Constitution-and exercising the discretion accorded to judges
under it-should seek to advance the cause of "workable government" by developing legal doctrine that takes account of political realities.4 1 In the case of Justice White, he plainly en-

38. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

39. 509 U.S. 630, 661(1993) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the type of
claim recognized in Shaw would give rise to "constant and unmanageable" judicial

intrusion into the redistricting process).
40. For my discussion of this point, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards A Constitutional Architecture For CooperativeFederalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).

41. Viewed on the functionalist ground alone, the merits of a federalismbased anti-commandeering rule is, to be sure, debatable. See Breyer, supra note
14, at 259 (suggesting that the anti-commandeering rule hinders the development
of cooperative federalism programs).

42. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). In terms of the significance of sensitivity to political re-

alities, Justice Jackson prefaced his opinion with the following candid explanation
of his approach to legal doctrine:
That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practi-

cal advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone
who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and

public anxiety.

While an interval of detached reflection may temper
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dorsed this perspective, underscoring that any legal regime the
Court institutes should be workable in practice. In one of his
flagship opinions, his dissent in INS v. Chadha, Justice White
quoted with approval Justice Jackson's "workable government"
concept and bemoaned the fact that the majority opinion invalidated nearly 200 statutory uses of the legislative veto by
taking a broad, formalist swipe at a well worn practice. 43 This
type of sensitivity not only reflects what Cass Sunstein calls
judicial minimalism," but also what others term a constitutional philosophy of "democratic experimentalism," which recognizes that judges should be mindful of the opportunity to experiment with alternate approaches until a single one emerges
as superior. 45 A hallmark of this approach is to encourage
judges to adopt contingent (or limited) rules-i.e., ones like
those in the dormant Commerce Clause context that can be
modified by congressional action-where there are reasons to
be concerned about the impact of the judgment in question.4 6
To Justice White's great credit, he took the concept of experimentation very seriously and, where appropriate, even
changed his approach to certain issues. This flexibility, which
Professor Nelson attributes to Justice White's view that "every-

teachings of that experience, they probably are a more realistic influence
on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision which
seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction.
Id. at 634.
43. 462 U.S. 919, 967, 978 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
44. See Sunstein, supra note 10. In Chadha, for example, Justice White began his opinion by noting that, on Justice Powell's rationale, the Court could have
invalidated the action before it and left standing an array of other statutory provisions. 462 U.S. at 967 n.1 (White, J., dissenting). To underscore the severe impact of the Court's decision, Justice White attached an appendix listing the affected statutory regimes. See id. at 1003.
45. See Michael Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-73 (1998); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution
of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). Again, in Chadha,
Justice White emphasized the uncertainty of the merits of the legislative veto in
criticizing the majority's decision, calling for more experimentalism before adopting a broad approach to the issue. See 462 U.S. at 976-977 (noting active debate
on issue); see also Dorf& Sabel, supra, at 441 & 441 n.581 (commenting favorably
on Justice White's position in Chadha).
46. As Chris Eisgruber puts it, this form of judicial action allows for the
"benefits of judicial involvement in questions of political structure, but [to address
the] worry that judges will make strategic errors, we might encourage judges to
impose restrictions subject to congressional revision-just as they do under ...
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Eisgruber, supra note 19, at 203.
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thing is up for grabs"4' can be best explained by Justice White's
awareness that changing social circumstances and experience
can justify different approaches. Two such notable instances of
Justice White's willingness to change his position are his views
on Times v. Sullivan" and Miranda v. Arizona.4 9 In Sullivan,
Justice White joined the majority opinion imposing a national
regime to govern libel actions by public officials, presumably
concluding that sufficient experimentation at the state level
with the standard adopted in that case revealed both its
soundness and workability.5 ° (Unlike Roe, for example, the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Sullivan was not a
novel one.) But as time went on, Justice White's judgment
about this experiment changed and he concluded that a less
federally restrictive regime would be preferable to the Sullivan
Significantly, in his Gertz v. Welch dissent, he
approach.'
extension of Sullivan to remake libel law in
Court's
the
termed
"all of or most of the 50 States" an "ill considered exercise" of
its authority.5 2 Invoking the experimentalist perspective, Justice White explained that "I would require something more
substantial than an undifferentiated fear of unduly burdensome punitive damage awards before retooling the established
common-law rule and depriving the States of the opportunity to
experiment with different methods for guarding against
abuses."53 Similarly, when he later criticized Sullivan, Justice
White suggested that the Court could have-and should haveadopted a less intrusive legal regime to govern libel law.54

47. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 1298.
48. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20 (noting that 11 states adopted actual
malice rule and that the consensus of scholarly opinion endorsed the rule).
51. Over twenty years after Sullivan, Justice White explained that "Sullivan was the first step in what proved to be a seemingly irresistible process of constitutionalizing the entire law of libel and slander." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment). Consequently, Justice White "came to have increasing doubts about

the soundness of the Court's approach and about some of the assumptions underlying it" and ultimately concluded that Sullivan was wrongly decided. Id. at 767.
52. 418 U.S. 323, 369-70 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 397.
54. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 771 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("In New York Times, instead of escalating the plaintiffs burden of
proof to an almost impossible level, we could have achieved our stated goal by limiting the recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the
press.").
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In Miranda and its progeny, Justice White took the opposite approach from that he took in Sullivan and the decisions in
its stead. Initially, he dissented from the creation of a new legal regime to govern interrogation, believing that the states
should be allowed more latitude on this score.55 Over time,
however, as the Miranda regime went into effect, Justice White
concluded that it did work and, consequently, he voted to retain-and even extend-it.5 6 Reflecting this experimentalist
approach to constitutional judging, Justice White would have,
in my view, joined the majority decision in United States v.
Dickerson to retain Miranda on the ground that, despite his
earlier concerns, Miranda now provides an effective and stable
regulatory regime." In sum, Justice White's judicial practicecaptured by the three elements of judicial strategy outlined
above-focused on devising rules for workable governance and
eschewing judicial oversight of unmanageable regimes that
take judges into terrain that is beyond their institutional competence.
I want to close by offering a different emphasis than Professor Nelson in order to explain the implications of Justice
White's judicial practice. As Professor Nelson explains, Justice
White's approach to judging reflected his concern that judicially developed rules lacked democratic legitimacy." This concern fits within the classic concern articulated by Alexander
Bickel's suggestion that the practice of judicial review reflects a
"counter-majoritarian difficulty"5 9 and a continuing academic
focus on the purported "undemocratic" nature of judicial review. 0 As my discussion suggests, I find it equally plausible
that Justice White's approach to judging does not reflect a con-

55. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
56. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (applying and extending
Miranda).
57. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (clarifying that
Miranda reflected a constitutional decision and declining to overrule it). In so doing, however, Justice White might well have emphasized the invitation, offered in
Miranda itself, for experimentation with "legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self- incrimination" other than the famous warnings
that are now routinely used-i.e., required videotaping of all confessions. Id. at
440-43; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 45, at 452-57 (emphasizing this point).
58. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 1293.
59.

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1962).

60. For a terrific exploration of this debate, see Barry Friedman, The Birth
Of An Academic Obsession: The History of The CountermajoritarianDifficulty,
Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
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courts' lack of democratic pedigree as such, but rather stems
from concerns related to the courts' institutional competence to
implement certain legal regimes.6 '
Like Professor Nelson, commentators routinely link arguments about the limits of judicial authority to claims that the
judiciary lacks democratic legitimacy. For some, this argument
leads to a tepid endorsement for an undemocratic practice; others argue for the abolition of judicial review entirely.62 There
is, however, an alternative perspective. In particular, as Chris
Eisgruber explains, there are ways of accounting for judicial
review that recognize how judges, like other branches of government, can represent the people and, acting in concert with
other governmental actors, can produce better and more democratic results than legislatures acting alone.6 3 Conceptualizing and implementing such a pragmatic account of judging
calls for more real-world examination of when and how judicial
review can be effective.6 4 As I see it, Justice White's legacy
provides support for such an account of judicial review, particularly when coupled with his sensitivity to the importance of judicial strategy. Significantly, this view does not rule out judicial policymaking-through
interstitial lawmaking, for
example-as illegitimate, but it calls for an acute awareness of
the judiciary's institutional limitations.6 5

61. Put differently, Justice White's approach can fit comfortably within the
Yale justification that judicial review reflects a tool of democracy - as opposed to
the Harvard critique offered by Bickel, among others. See Friedman, supra note
60, at 231-36 (contrasting traditions); see also Louis Oberdorfer, Justice White and
Legal Realism: An Addendum to Professor Stith-Cabranes, 74 U. COLO. L. REV.
1567, 1568 (2003) (contrasting the Harvard School and Yale Schools, noting that
the latter focuses on the practical effect of the relevant decision). The Yale conception of judicial review is nicely captured by its former Dean, Eugene Rostow.
See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof JudicialReview, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1952).
62. For a cogent argument along these lines to abolish the practice of judicial review, see JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
63.

See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

(2001); Eisgruber, supra note 19. Justice Breyer recently offered a similar defense
of judicial review. See Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 245 (2002).

64. In urging a move away from the obsession with the "countermajoritarian difficulty," Barry Friedman has called for this approach to constitutional theory. See Friedman, supra note 60, at 257 (calling for an inquiry into the
political economy of judging that would "study judicial review on more pragmatic
terms, trying to assess how well it functions, and what it offers in the real world").
65. In his dissent in Basic v. Levinson, for example, Justice White reminded
the Court of this very point:

1318

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol.74

One important means of implementing a democratic experimentalist, minimalist, and pragmatic account of judicial
review is to look for judges in the mold of Justice White. In
this regard, an ideal judge would bring to the bench not only
Justice White's appreciation for judicial strategy (whether selfconsciously theorized or not) and experience in government and
practice, but also the personal qualities of collegiality, a sense
of humor, and the considerable humility that made Justice
White an important member of the Supreme Court for over
thirty years. Justice White set a tremendously high bar in this
regard and his personal presence cannot be replaced, but by
appreciating his sage perspective on the role of the judiciary,
his legacy will continue to live on. And that is why, despite
whatever discomfort Justice White himself might have had
with this conference, it is worth examining, explaining, and
remembering his unique contributions to the Supreme Court.

The Congress, with its superior resources and expertise, is far better
equipped than the federal court for the task of determining how modern
economic theory and global finance markets require that established notions of legal fraud be modified. In choosing to make these decisions itself, the Court, I fear, embarks on a course that it does not genuinely
understand, giving rise to consequences it cannot foresee.
485 U.S. 224, 254 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).

